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Thompson: Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Failed To "Save" Miranda

EVADING MIRANDA: HOW SEIBERT AND
PATANE FAILED TO “SAVE” MIRANDA†
Sandra Guerra Thompson∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona1 announced a remedy to
counteract the effects of psychological tactics during custodial
interrogations that can create a coercive atmosphere and overwhelm
suspects of limited education or experience.2 The Court proscribed a set
of “warnings” that should be issued in order to dispel the coercion in the
interrogation room.
The warnings would give the suspect the
information needed to make a “free choice” in deciding whether or not
to speak to the police.3 Forty years after the pronouncement of these
goals—to dispel coercion and empower suspects to make better choices
for themselves during interrogations—we can now clearly see that the
Miranda experiment has been a “spectacular failure.”4

†
In 1998, Professor Charles D. Weisselberg made an eloquent plea for the Supreme
Court to “save” Miranda by returning to the “original vision” of Miranda and “excluding
from evidence, for all purposes, statements . . . taken in violation of Miranda.” See Charles
D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 112 (1998). Some scholars
continue today to call on the Court to improve the way in which the Miranda rule operates
in the interrogation room. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in
Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). This
Article takes the view that Seibert and Patane greatly diminish, if not extinguish, any hope
that the Court will transform Miranda into an effective tool for curbing unduly coercive
interrogation practices.
∗
UH Law Foundation Professor of Law and Director of the Criminal Justice Institute,
University of Houston Law Center. The author wishes to thank Alfredo Garcia,
Christopher Slobogin, and George C. Thomas, III, for their insightful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article. The author also owes a debt of gratitude to Mon Yin Lung,
Associate Director of the O’Quinn Law Library of the UH Law Center for her outstanding
research assistance. She also gratefully acknowledges the UH Law Foundation for its
generous support.
1
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
Id. at 445–56.
3
See George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:
“Embedded” in Our National Culture? in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 203
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2002).
4
See George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation
Room Miranda’s Waning Protections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1092, 1094 n.16 (2003) (listing
citations of other authors with similar views); see also Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to
Disregard Miranda, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 452 (2002) (stating that “the future of the Miranda
rules is both uncertain and bleak” because Miranda’s mild exclusionary sanction will lead
to increased noncompliance); Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
309, 309 (2003) (stating that “Miranda v. Arizona is a hoax” in that it has had little effect on
police behavior and may even cover for improper conduct).
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Two cases decided last term—Missouri v. Seibert5 and United States v.
Patane6—bear on a growing practice of “going outside” Miranda,
meaning intentionally violating Miranda in a number of different ways
that can yield admissible statements or other evidence. 7 Ordinarily, if
the police violate the rule in Miranda, statements directly obtained by
that violation are inadmissible in the government’s case in chief.
However, the Supreme Court has created many exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. These exceptions create incentives for the police
intentionally to violate Miranda when the benefits are considered to
outweigh the costs.8
Seibert involved one variant of the practice of intentionally violating
Miranda, what is commonly dubbed “going outside” Miranda. In Seibert,
the police used the “question-first” tactic in which an investigating
officer interrogates a suspect without giving Miranda warnings and
obtains incriminating statements, and then issues the warnings to obtain
a second, and presumably admissible, version of the statement. The
Court essentially teaches the police how to violate Miranda intentionally
and then “cure” the violation so as to render the incriminating
statements admissible.
The Patane case, on the other hand, allowed the Court to reconsider
the admissibility of physical evidence discovered as a result of
statements taken in violation of Miranda. In Patane, the Court simply
turns a blind eye to the fact that exceptions to Miranda encourage
intentional violations. The Court approves the use of physical evidence
found as a direct result of Miranda violations. Wisconsin v. Knapp,9 a case
following Patane, makes clear that physical evidence discovered as a
result of a Miranda violation is fully admissible even when the violation
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
542 U.S. 630 (2004).
7
Throughout this Article, I refer to “violations of Miranda” as a shorthand way to say
that the police did not follow the warnings and waiver procedures set out in the Miranda
decision, not to indicate that a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights have been violated. There
is considerable disagreement among scholars, and among members of the Supreme Court,
as to whether the Fifth Amendment applies in the interrogation room or whether the
suspect’s constitutional rights are not violated until the point that a court admits evidence
taken “in violation” of Miranda at trial. See generally Clymer, supra note 4 (arguing that
Miranda does not impose a constitutional duty on the police to issue warnings prior to
custodial interrogation). This Article takes no position on this issue.
8
For a discussion of the practice of deliberately violating Miranda to gain other
evidentiary advantages, see infra notes 154–59.
9
542 U.S. 952 (2004) (following Patane and vacating the lower court decision to exclude
physical evidence obtained as a direct result of a Miranda violation that was an intentional
attempt to prevent the suspect from exercising his Fifth Amendment rights).
5
6
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is an intentional attempt to undermine a suspect’s Fifth Amendment
rights in order to discover the evidence.
With the Seibert and Patane decisions, the Court has reaffirmed the
extremely limited usefulness of Miranda as a tool for protecting suspects
from coercive police tactics. Seibert and Patane represent the coup de
grace for the demise of Miranda. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
interpreting Miranda, viewed in its entirety, consists of a long series of
decisions that have gradually chipped away the protection the Miranda
warnings were intended to provide and has encouraged deliberate
attempts to circumvent the warnings requirement.10 For example, the
Court’s ruling allowing the government to use a person’s post-arrest,
pre-warning silence as evidence of guilt creates an incentive to
deliberately delay issuing warnings.11 If an arrested person remains
silent, that silence can be used to impeach the person’s exculpatory
testimony at trial. If the person volunteers statements upon arrest, those
statements may also be used because Miranda does not apply to
statements that are not the product of “interrogation.”12
Moreover, all the rules pertaining to the sufficiency of warnings,
waiver, and invocation of rights tend to encourage the police to
interrogate even when they may know that the suspect does not
understand the rights, may not intend to waive them, or may be trying to
assert them. The case law excuses police errors, readily finds suspects to
have “voluntarily waived” their rights in cases that test credulity, and
demands lawyer-like clarity in order for suspects to invoke their rights.13
Then, too, even if a suspect does clearly invoke the right to silence, the
Court allows the police to try again later to get the suspect to give up his
or her rights.14 Only when a suspect clearly invokes the right to counsel,
protected by the Sixth Amendment, and not simply Miranda, has the

In the Court’s own words, “[following Miranda], subsequent cases have reduced the
impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement.” Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000).
11
See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982). A person’s pre-arrest silence may also be
used. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980). The only limitation the Court has
recognized is the use of pretrial silence after arrest and the delivery of Miranda warnings.
See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
12
See infra notes 56–65 and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 66–115 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
10
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Court provided more solicitous treatment, but few suspects demand a
lawyer with the clarity required by the Court.15
If, even with those advantages working it their favor, the police are
still found to have violated a suspect’s Miranda rights, the Court has
never applied a stringent exclusionary rule as a remedy. Just six years
after announcing the decision, the Supreme Court held that Miranda’s
exclusionary rule does not apply to the “fruits,” evidence derived from
statements obtained in violation of Miranda.16 The Court also has
allowed the use of such statements for purposes other than to prove the
government’s case in chief, such as impeachment.17 In other words,
statements obtained by means of Miranda violations are freely admissible
except for use in the government’s case in chief. In addition, Patane now
broadens the long-standing rule that physical evidence derived from
Miranda violations is freely admissible even as part of the government’s
case in chief, clarifying that even intentional violations may yield
admissible fruits.18 The Court also recognized an exception for Miranda
violations, presumably including intentional violations, that are
necessary to protect public safety.19 No one is likely to dispute the
necessity of violating Miranda under such circumstances, and since the
suspect likely created the danger to public safety that necessitates
immediate interrogation, this may be the one instance in which an
intentional violation of Miranda is rightly allowed.
Not surprisingly, the police increasingly ignore Miranda. This is not
to say that they do not issue the warnings—they do. In the vast majority
of cases, police issue Miranda warnings as required so as to make the
resulting statements admissible as evidence in the prosecution’s case in
chief20 and obtain waivers before proceeding to interrogate a suspect.21
The warnings and waiver process is so easily manipulated that some
observers have concluded that the police have “adapted” to Miranda and
If the right to counsel is invoked, police may not try again to get a waiver unless the
suspect first re-initiates a generalized discussion of the investigation. See infra notes 98–103
and accompanying text.
16
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451–52 (1974) (upholding admission of testimony of
a witness discovered solely by means of statements obtained in good faith violation of
Miranda).
17
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
18
See 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
19
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984).
20
George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1975 (2004)
(finding compliance with the Miranda doctrine to be ninety-five percent and citing other
similar findings).
21
See Thomas & Leo, supra note 3, at 247 (stating that seventy-eight to ninety-six percent
of suspects are issued warnings and waive their rights).
15
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now use it as just another psychological tool to extricate confessions from
suspects.22 The very fact that a person has given a waiver also bolsters
the case that subsequent statements were voluntarily given.23
In other cases, suspects refuse to waive their rights and instead
invoke their rights to silence and/or counsel. In these cases, observers
have found a fairly high rate of Miranda violations by police officers who
simply ignore the invocation of rights and continue the interrogation.
Indeed, in some jurisdictions police were—and perhaps continue to be—
trained to “go outside” Miranda.24
Thus, Miranda now serves police interests in one of two ways. First,
in cases in which police obtain waivers, it insulates a stressful
interrogation process from judicial scrutiny to determine whether the
confession was voluntarily given.25 Second, in cases in which the rights
are invoked, the police may be able to ignore Miranda, perhaps
deliberately, and elicit statements for impeachment use as well as
uncovering other admissible derivative evidence.26 Interrogations in
which police officers deliberately ignore invocations of Miranda’s
protections can greatly affect the “voluntariness” of a confession as well.
Yet, the due process voluntariness test continues to prove as ineffectual
today in curbing the psychologically coercive practices of custodial
interrogation as it was perceived to be by the Supreme Court when
Miranda was decided.27
These concerns have led at least one
See generally Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern
Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397
(1999) (urging that police have “adapted” to Miranda in order to use the requirements to
their advantage).
23
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004) (“[G]iving the warnings and getting
a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility . . . .”); see also Thomas,
supra note 4, at 1977 (stating that in seventy-five percent of cases involving waivers,
voluntariness is not ever challenged, and in those cases challenging voluntariness of waiver
or of answers given after waiver, government prevails in ninety-six percent of cases);
Thomas & Leo, supra note 3, at 253.
24
See infra notes 149–54 and accompanying text.
25
See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608–09 (2004).
26
See infra notes 116–18, 129–37 and accompanying text.
27
The Miranda decision is viewed as the Supreme Court’s attempt to provide greater
protection for suspects’ rights than the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process voluntariness
test. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455–56 (1966) (noting that incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a “police-dominated atmosphere” and the use of tactics that
“trade[] on the weakness of individuals” might not be involuntary under the traditional
due process test). One measure of the effectiveness of the voluntariness test in ferreting out
confessions given under unduly coercive circumstances is the rate of innocent people who
confess falsely. See generally WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE
INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 139–89 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2001)
(addressing the scope of the problem of police-induced false confessions and giving
22
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commentator to conclude that Miranda could do more harm than good if
deliberate violations of the rule become more pervasive.28
Seibert and Patane presented the perfect opportunities for the Court
to put a stop to deliberate violations of Miranda, but the decisions do
exactly the opposite. Thus, this Article concludes that the time has come
for scholars likewise to ignore Miranda and focus instead on other
protections against coercive interrogation tactics. Miranda was originally
intended to provide a bright line rule that would protect suspects from
coercive tactics that are inconsistent with the right against selfincrimination. It has failed to provide this protection, so the time has
come to begin the search for alternative remedies.
Part II of this Article demonstrates how the Supreme Court’s
Miranda jurisprudence has gradually eroded the rule by creating
incentives to interrogate even when the police may be aware that a
suspect has not received or understood the warnings or when it is
apparent that the suspect does not mean to waive his or her rights. Part
III reviews the recent decisions in Seibert and Patane, both of which may
encourage rather than curtail the growing practice of intentionally
violating Miranda. The Article concludes with a plea for scholars and
policy makers to look beyond Miranda and embrace new, bright line
rules for custodial interrogations.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CHOICE: WHY POLICE FOLLOW OR IGNORE
MIRANDA
Miranda represents the Supreme Court’s effort to provide affirmative
protection to criminal suspects who may face grueling and
psychologically manipulative interrogations while in police custody. Of
course, constitutional law prohibits coerced, or involuntary, confessions,

examples); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, Coerced Confessions: The Decision to Confess
Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 983 (1997) (citing
misuse of standard interrogation techniques as a major cause of false confessions);
Innocence Project, False Confessions, www.innocenceproject.org/causes/falseconfessions.
php (last visited Mar. 12, 2006); see also Rob Warden, The Role of False Confessions in Illinois
Wrongful Murder Convictions Since 1970 (2003), available at www.law.northwestern.edu/
depts/clinic/wrongful/False/Confessions2.htm. But cf. Slobogin, supra note 4, at 313
(noting that research provides insights on types of tactics most likely to induce false
confessions).
28
See Weisselberg, supra note †, at 162 (“If [deliberate violations of Miranda] ever
pervade[] our system, we inevitably will realize that half a Miranda rule is worse by far
than no rule at all.”).
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such as those obtained through physical violence.29 However, the
Supreme Court has never prohibited all practices that create
psychological or physical pressures to confess. How could it? Is
continual questioning for eight hours so long that a suspect will be
“compelled” to confess? Twelve hours? Fifteen hours? It may be
impossible to say how long is too long because suspects’ breaking points
will vary according to the psychological or physical fortitude of the
individual suspect. Similar questions are raised by other aspects of
interrogations. How much food must be provided? How much sleep
should a person be allowed? And so forth. Thus, it is especially
problematic for a court to lay down bright line rules about any particular
police practice as a matter of constitutional interpretation.30 Except for
practices such as the use or threatened use of violence, the Court has
declined to provide much specific guidance on how the police should
conduct interrogations.
Instead, the Court created what was originally perceived as a bright
line rule in Miranda, requiring that suspects get information about their
rights so that they can make the best decisions about whether or not to
submit to questioning. Miranda’s goals might be summarized as follows:
to dispel the coercive environment of the interrogation room by arming
suspects with knowledge of their rights to silence and the assistance of
counsel, and then empowering suspects to determine whether to waive
or invoke those rights.31 Achieving the original goals of dispelling the
coercive atmosphere of the interrogation room through warnings and
waiver—with the benefit of forty years of hindsight—seems to have been
doomed to failure from the start.
For one thing, the Miranda Court did not even endeavor to fully and
effectively protect a suspect’s right to remain silent in the face of
government questioning. We might imagine a suspect’s rights during
custodial interrogation as falling somewhere along a spectrum that
measures the extent to which those rights are protected, and which
negatively correlates with the government’s likelihood of obtaining a
29
See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (stating that convictions resting
solely upon confessions extorted by means of brutality and violence violate due process).
30
The Court has found that extreme deprivations of sleep or food, or extended periods
of isolation, have produced involuntary confessions in violation of due process. See, e.g.,
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (finding that two sandwiches during a forty-hour
detention and interrogation produced an involuntary confession); Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191 (1957) (finding that isolation for more than a week also produced an involuntary
confession); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (finding that an interrogation for
thirty-six hours without allowing suspect to rest produced an involuntary confession).
31
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58.
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confession. At one end of the spectrum is the complete deprivation of
rights, such as the use of torture to obtain confessions. Early in the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court declared that confessions obtained
by means of brutality and violence run afoul of the Due Process Clause
by violating our basic notions of decency and morality32 and because
they cannot be trusted as reliable evidence of guilt.33 Physical or mental
torture is a sure means of obtaining a confession, but that confession may
well be false.34
At the other end of the spectrum is a system that would either ban
interrogations altogether or automatically appoint an attorney to
represent a suspect taken into custody prior to police questioning. Either
approach would fully and effectively protect a person’s right against
self-incrimination. Just prior to the issuance of the Miranda decision,
some commentators opined that the Supreme Court seemed inclined to
require that attorneys be provided to all suspects during custodial
interrogations.35 Such a move was feared by the law enforcement
establishment, who believed it would effectively eliminate interrogations
and the ability to obtain confessions, not to mention other evidence
discovered as a result of confessions. The fear, of course, was based on a
belief that any defense attorney would advise his or her client to invoke
the Fifth Amendment right to silence and refuse to answer any
questions.
The Court did not go so far as to require the presence of counsel,
apparently concluding that the Fifth Amendment did not require the
government to take affirmative steps to ensure full and effective
implementation of suspects’ rights. The Court in Miranda opted for a
compromise36 position instead, providing a remedy that falls between
the two ends of the rights spectrum: Suspects may not be tortured into
confessing, but attorneys are not to be provided during interrogations.
The rule requires only warnings and waiver. Even the original “vision”
of Miranda does nothing at all to curb the psychological and physical
Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
Id. (“And the trial equally is a mere pretense where the state authorities have
contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence.”).
34
Recent developments exonerating persons who have been wrongly convicted confirm
that false confessions can be obtained from persons through a variety of means, including
torture. See Innocence Project, supra note 27 (providing synopses of cases of false
confessions in which a wrongly-convicted person was eventually exonerated and in which
an actual perpetrator was eventually apprehended).
35
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440 (noting the “wealth of scholarly material” addressing the
Escobedo decision).
36
See Clymer, supra note 4, at 483 n.154.
32
33
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strain of interrogation strategies.37 Indeed, the same manipulative tactics
that concerned the Miranda Court continue to be promoted in police
training manuals,38 perhaps the clearest real-world evidence that
Miranda has failed.
As the following Parts outline, the Supreme Court’s Miranda case
law, even before Seibert and Patane, had diminished any possibility that
Miranda might play even a moderately effective role in reducing the
coercive atmosphere in the interrogation room. Instead, the Court’s
decisions have had the perverse effect of permitting police interrogators
to use Miranda to their advantage—and to the disadvantage of the
suspects questioned. The Court has encouraged the police to circumvent
Miranda’s intended protections in three ways:
(1) by obtaining
incriminating evidence either through a person’s statements or through
his or her silence before the issuance of warnings; (2) by proceeding as if
the suspect comprehends the warnings when there is reason to believe
the suspect does not; and (3) by interrogating a suspect when there is
reason to believe the suspect does not mean to waive his or her rights
and may even be trying to invoke them. In addition, the Court has
shielded law enforcement from civil liability for Miranda violations,
including intentional violations.
A. Obtaining Evidence Without Issuing Warnings
1.

Using Post-Arrest, Pre-Warning Silence

One way in which the Court has encouraged the police to
circumvent the intended purpose of Miranda is by creating an incentive
to delay issuing the warnings in order to derive evidentiary benefits. In
Fletcher v. Weir,39 the Court allowed the use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence to impeach a defendant’s credibility. At the time the defendant,
Weir, was arrested, he did not try to justify his actions as self-defense. In
his testimony at trial, however, he raised a self-defense claim. The
purpose of mentioning his silence was to cast doubt on his credibility,
presumably because one would expect a person in that situation to
protest his innocence at the time of arrest.

37
See Weisselberg, supra note †, at 184–87 (arguing that Miranda was intended as a
constitutional rule that should provide a complete rule of exclusion for objectively bad faith
violations).
38
Indeed, the manual is now in its fourth edition. See FRED EDWARD INBAU ET AL.,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS 498–518 (4th ed. 2004).
39
455 U.S. 603 (1982).
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The Court had previously rejected the use of a suspect’s post-arrest
silence in a situation in which Miranda warnings had been issued in Doyle
v. Ohio.40 The decision found that “[s]ilence in the wake of these
warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these
Miranda rights.”41
Thus, the Court concluded that it would be
fundamentally unfair to impeach a person with his post-arrest, postMiranda silence because silence in these circumstances is “insolubly
ambiguous.”42 On the other hand, the issue in Jenkins v. Anderson43 was
whether the impeachment use of one’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda, silence
violated either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. In rejecting the
defendant’s due process argument, the Court stated that “no
governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before arrest,”
but that his “failure to speak occurred before [he] was taken into custody
and given Miranda warnings.”44 Thus, the Court, applying the reasoning
of Doyle, held that such use of the defendant’s pre-arrest silence did not
violate the Constitution.45
The facts in Fletcher presented a closer question. In Fletcher, the
defendant had stabbed another man and then gone home. The police
arrived at his home and arrested him but did not read him his Miranda
rights.46 Weir did not say anything to the police about the circumstances
of the stabbing, but at trial he took the stand in his defense and claimed
the killing was in self-defense. The Sixth Circuit found that the use of
the defendant’s post-arrest silence violated due process, rejecting the
argument that the presence or absence of Miranda warnings should be
determinative. The appeals court stated:
We think that an arrest, by itself, is governmental action
which implicitly induces a defendant to remain silent.
When one combines a suspect’s fears and anxieties upon
arrest with widespread knowledge of one’s right to
remain silent, the result is often just that—silence. Given
these realities, we think it is fundamentally unfair to

426 U.S. 610 (1976).
Id. at 617.
42
Id.
43
447 U.S. 231 (1980).
44
Id. at 240.
45
The Court rejected the Fifth Amendment argument on the grounds that the
government is only allowed to impeach the defendant after he chose to “cast aside his cloak
of silence” by testifying and that impeachment “advances the truthfinding function of the
criminal trial.” Id. at 238.
46
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 603 (1982).
40
41
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allow impeachment through the use of any post-arrest
silence.47
The court also noted that to allow post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to
be used for impeachment would “discourage the reading of Miranda
warnings.”48 There is no requirement that Miranda rights be read
immediately upon taking a suspect into custody, although most police
departments have adopted such a policy.49 The Sixth Circuit expressed
concern that the benefits of prompt issuance of warnings could be lost if
police were given an incentive to delay the reading of rights.50
The Supreme Court did not share the circuit court’s concerns about
losing the benefits of prompt warnings by creating an incentive
deliberately to delay warnings. The Court ignored the lower court’s
arguments, and those of every other court that had considered the issue,
that the mere fact of arrest can induce fear and anxiety that is often
sufficient to induce silence and that the right to remain silent is widely
known, even if the police do not issue warnings.51 Instead, the Court
found no due process violation in the impeachment use of Weir’s postarrest silence “[i]n the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances
embodied in the Miranda warnings . . . .”52
Delaying the issuance of warnings does not violate the terms of
Miranda, as Miranda only requires that warnings be given prior to
custodial interrogation.53 So long as police refrain from interrogating a
suspect who is taken into custody, Miranda is not violated. However, the
Fletcher case means that the government always benefits from delaying
the issuance of warnings. If the arrestee volunteers statements, any
incriminating statements are fully admissible. If the arrestee remains
silent, his or her silence can be used for impeachment should the person
take the stand at trial. The Miranda decision portrayed the custodial
setting as inherently coercive and envisioned that the warnings would
47
Weir v. Fletcher, 658 F.2d 1126, 1131 (6th Cir. 1981). The appeals court also noted that
every other decision to date was consistent with this position. Id.
48
Id. at 1132.
49
Id. (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980), for the proposition that
warnings are not required upon taking suspect into custody, but rather prior to
interrogation).
50
Fletcher, 658 F.2d at 1132.
51
Id. at 1130–31.
52
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982).
53
See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (“[T]he special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are
required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in
custody is subjected to interrogation.”).
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dispel that coercive atmosphere.54 Fletcher encourages the practice of
deliberately prolonging the coercion for as long as possible.
2.

Limiting the Need to Issue Warnings

The Miranda rule requires the issuance of warnings for any person in
“custody”55 prior to “interrogation.” In Rhode Island v. Innis,56 the Court
limited the reach of the Miranda rule by finding that police officers who
had discussed a suspect’s case with each other while in the suspect’s
presence were not “interrogating” the suspect. In so finding, the Court
encouraged the police to try to obtain statements from suspects without
first issuing warnings by holding conversations with each other that
might cause a suspect to speak.
The facts involved a suspect, Innis, who was arrested for robbery,
given the warnings, and immediately asserted his right to an attorney.57
The officers proceeded to transport him to the police station and, during
the course of a few minutes and less than a mile’s drive, the officers
conversed amongst themselves, knowing that Innis could hear their
conversation.58 The officers discussed the suspect’s missing shotgun,
and they talked about how many handicapped children at a nearby
school played in the area and that they should search for the gun for the
children’s safety. One officer then stated that it would be too bad if a
little girl picked up the gun and accidentally killed herself.59 Innis then
interrupted the conversation and offered to show them where the gun
was located.
The case presented the issue of the definition of “interrogation” for
purposes of the Miranda rule. The Court sensibly defined interrogation
as “either express questioning or its functional equivalent” by which the
Court meant “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.”60 The definition also contemplates that if a practice is intended
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448–52 (1966).
See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam) (“[T]he ultimate
inquiry [in defining custody] is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (quoting Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam))).
56
446 U.S. 291 (1980).
57
Id. at 294.
58
Id. at 294–95.
59
Id. at 295 (“He [Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the little—I believe he said a
girl—would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself.”).
60
Id. at 300–01.
54
55
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to elicit a response, it will most likely also be one that they should have
known was reasonably likely to elicit a response.61
It is the application of this definition to the facts of the case that
narrows the reach of the Miranda rule. The Court found that the officers’
conversation amounted to “no more than a few offhand remarks” and
that the officers had no reason to know that Innis would be “peculiarly
susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of
handicapped children.”62 Moreover, the Court concluded that the facts
do not suggest that the officers’ comments were intended to elicit a
response.63 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, stating
that he was “utterly at a loss” to see how the majority could have
concluded that no interrogation took place.64 Justice Stevens’ dissenting
opinion viewed the Court’s “stinted test” as “creat[ing] an incentive for
police to ignore a suspect’s invocation of his rights in order to make
continued attempts to extract information from him.”65
B. Transforming Miranda From “Safeguards” for Suspects to an
Interrogation Tool for Police—The Warning and Waiver Requirements
If the Miranda rule is easy to apply and if it is easy to obtain a
suspect’s waiver of his or her rights, then it is that much easier for the
police to proceed with interrogation and obtain fully admissible
statements. Supreme Court decisions in these areas have indeed turned
Miranda’s “safeguards”66 into a minor formality that is not likely to
impede the path to interrogation and may in fact be a useful
interrogation tool.
The Court first signaled that it would not apply stringent rules
regarding the issuance of warnings in its 1974 decision in Michigan v.
Tucker.67 In dicta, the Court commented on how courts should view
good faith errors in the issuance of warnings: “Just as the law does not
require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fair one, it cannot
realistically require that policeman investigating serious crimes make no
Id. at 308 n.7.
Id. at 302–03.
63
Id. at 303 n.9.
64
Id. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65
Id. at 312, 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66
Early in the post-Miranda case law, the Court began referring to Miranda’s warnings
and waiver procedure as “safeguards” rather than “requirements,” underscoring the view
of the procedure as “prophylactic” and not in themselves constitutional rights. See
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
67
Id. at 446.
61
62
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errors whatsoever.”68 Thus, despite the fact that it would be a simple
matter to expect police officers to read the warnings from a card so as to
ensure accuracy, the Court instead chose to overlook sloppy recitations,
even in situations in which the faulty warnings might mislead some
suspects.
The Court’s decision in California v. Prysock69 made clear that police
officers could issue warnings in varying forms without violating
Miranda. The lower court had ruled that police should give the warnings
using the precise language of the Miranda opinion,70 and it considered it
Miranda’s greatest strength that its precise requirements were so easily
met.71 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that “[q]uite the contrary,
Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to
satisfy its strictures.”72
This variation in language was challenged in Duckworth v. Eagan,73 in
which the police informed the suspect that an attorney would be
appointed for him “‘if and when you go to court.’”74 Reiterating that the
warnings are not in themselves constitutional rights but prophylactic
safeguards, the Court concluded that the issue was “simply whether the
warnings reasonably ‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by
Miranda.’”75 Interestingly, the Court in Prysock had approved the
warnings in that case because they “fully conveyed” the Miranda rights,76
but in Duckworth the standard adopted was whether the rights were
“reasonably conveyed.” Finding that the warnings given in the case
accurately reflected the state procedure for appointment of counsel, i.e.,
“in court,” the majority concluded that the warnings did reasonably
convey to the suspect his Miranda rights.77
Writing for the four dissenting members of the Court in Duckworth,
Justice Marshall argued that the “if and when you go to court” caveat
would be misunderstood by most suspects who would likely conclude
that no attorney would be provided until trial.78 Even worse, he believed
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss3/5

Id.
453 U.S. 355 (1981).
Id.
Id. at 359.
Id.
492 U.S. 197 (1989).
Id. at 197.
Id. at 203 (alterations in original).
Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361.
Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203–04.
Id. at 217 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that the average suspect would assume that he faced indefinite deferral
of interrogation until such time as he might obtain the assistance of
counsel “if and when” he goes to court. Given the choice of trying to
clear himself of suspicion immediately without the assistance of counsel
or waiting until such time when counsel might be appointed, a suspect
might choose to proceed without the assistance of counsel, a choice that
the dissenters found to be fraught with coercion.79
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has eased the burden on the
prosecution to prove that a suspect made a voluntary waiver and
encourages police officers to begin questioning even in situations in
which they may feel the suspect does not actually intend to waive his
rights or may not have the capacity to understand his rights. The
suspect agreed to talk to FBI agents, refused to sign the waiver at the
bottom of an “Advice of Rights” form, and did not explicitly waive his
right to counsel in North Carolina v. Butler.80 Ignoring any possible
significance of his refusal to sign the waiver form, the Court assumed
that Butler had explicitly waived his right to silence by stating that he
would talk to the agents. The only issue then was whether he had also
implicitly waived his right to counsel. The Court concluded that “[a]n
express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent
or of the right to counsel is . . . not inevitably either necessary or
sufficient to establish waiver.”81
“[S]ilence, coupled with an
understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver”
may be sufficient to prove waiver.82 While maintaining that the courts
should presume that a suspect has not waived his rights and that “the
prosecution’s burden is great,” the Court nonetheless concluded that “in

Id. at 217–18.
441 U.S. 369, 370–71 (1979).
81
Id. at 373. The Court has found waivers in other situations in which the suspect’s
conduct betrays an erroneous understanding of the warning that “anything you say can be
used against you.” Many suspects apparently believe that only written statements can be
offered into evidence. For example, in Connecticut v. Barrett, the suspect refused to make a
written statement without the presence of counsel, but the suspect was willing to make an
oral statement. 479 U.S. 523, 525–26 (1987). The Court held that the suspect had invoked
his right to counsel for the limited purpose of making a written statement, but that he had
validly waived his rights for purposes of offering oral statements. Id. at 529.
In Fare v. Michael C., the Court held that the government could satisfy its burden to
prove a valid waiver if, viewing the totality of the circumstances, the waiver appears to
have been validly given, and the Court determined that the totality of the circumstances
test is adequate, even in a case involving a juvenile. 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
82
Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
79
80
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at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and
words of the person interrogated.”83
It is especially telling that the Court chose a case in which the
suspect had not even graduated from high school, might not have been
literate,84 and refused to sign the waiver form. The record also suggests
that he had not been read his rights just prior to questioning, although he
had been advised of his rights sometime earlier upon arrest. The facts of
the case thus present a weak case for finding that the suspect understood
his rights and clearly intended to waive them. Yet the Supreme Court
chose this case in which to rule that police can infer a valid waiver from
a person’s words and conduct in combination with their silence.
Studies confirm that groups, such as persons with low intelligence or
mental problems, juveniles, persons whose native language is not
English, and deaf defendants, tend not to comprehend the Miranda rights
and do not appreciate the significance of waiving them.85 Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a suspect’s inability to
fully comprehend his Miranda rights and give a meaningful waiver
should render any resulting confession inadmissible. The suspect in
Colorado v. Connelly86 suffered from chronic schizophrenia and was in a
psychotic state when he confessed.87 The Court rejected the Colorado
Supreme Court’s finding that Connelly was incapable of giving a
voluntary waiver of his rights due to his mental impairment. The Court
determined that the sole concern of the Fifth Amendment is
“governmental coercion” and the “voluntariness of a waiver of this [Fifth
Amendment] privilege has always depended on the absence of police
overreaching.”88 It did not matter that the suspect felt compelled to
waive his rights and confess by the “voice of God”; unless the police
acted inappropriately in obtaining the waiver, it would be considered
voluntary.
The voluntariness of a waiver is also not affected by the fact that a
suspect is unaware that an attorney has been retained to represent him

Id.
The majority states that the agents had determined that he was literate. Id. at 370.
However, the dissenting opinion points out that there was a dispute in the record on this
issue. Id. at 378 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85
See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77–87 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2005).
86
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
87
Id. at 161.
88
Id. at 170.
83
84
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and is at the police station seeking to consult with the suspect.89 Nor
does it make a difference that the suspect is unaware of the seriousness
of the charges for which he is being questioned.90
In addition, Professors Leo and White have suggested that the police
have learned to use the issuance of Miranda warnings in one of three
ways, two of which can induce waivers.91 First, they may issue them in a
simple, neutral way, without trying to induce a waiver in any way,92
which is probably the method most consistent with the Supreme Court’s
original intention.
Second, they may try to de-emphasize the
significance of the warnings, treating them as a mere formality, as a way
of disarming a suspect and setting the person at ease, making it easier to
obtain a waiver.93 Finally, the police may offer suspects benefits in
exchange for waivers.94
In sum, the warnings need not be given with much precision and
may even be given in a misleading way and still be considered adequate.
In obtaining waivers, a suspect may engage in equivocal behavior, such
as refusing to sign a waiver form, and not explicitly waive the right to
counsel, but a court could still find that a valid waiver occurred. Even if
a suspect does not actually understand the rights or the significance of
waiving them, e.g., due to mental impairment, the waiver will be
considered voluntary unless the police act improperly. Considering all
of these factors, issuing warnings and obtaining waivers could not be
easier.
C. Increasing Suspects’ Burden to Invoke Miranda Rights
The Court has found a valid waiver of rights in cases in which the
facts suggest that was not the suspect’s intent, but the same has been true
for invocations of the rights. Even though suspects may try to invoke
their rights—and even if the police understand that this is the suspect’s
intent—the Court has imposed a high degree of clarity which means that
police can ignore unclear invocations. An officer can continue with the
interrogation unless the invocation is clearly asserted. Moreover, even a
suspect who manages to speak precisely in asserting the right to silence
will not necessarily be spared from later attempts to obtain a waiver of
that right. Under certain circumstances, the police can try again to get a
89
90
91
92
93
94

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1986).
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1987).
See Leo & White, supra note 22, at 431–47.
Id. at 432–33.
Id. at 433–39.
Id. at 440–47.
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waiver from a suspect who has affirmatively invoked his right to silence,
although not when a suspect invokes the right to an attorney.
If a suspect clearly invokes the right to silence, the police must
immediately cease the interrogation. However, the Court’s decision in
Michigan v. Mosley95 stands for the proposition that Miranda is not
violated if the police wait for a significant period of time, i.e., more than
two hours, issue warnings for a second time and attempt again to obtain
a waiver, this time to discuss a different offense.96 The Supreme Court
held that the police had “‘scrupulously honored’” Mosley’s “‘right to cut
off questioning.’”97
In contrast, the Court in Edwards v. Arizona98 held that once a suspect
has invoked the right to counsel, unless the suspect re-initiates a
discussion of the pending charges, the police may not initiate a second
interrogation by again issuing warnings and trying again to obtain a
waiver until counsel has been made available to the suspect.99 The
outcome in Edwards was predictable, given the directive in the Miranda
opinion that clearly states that if a suspect requests an attorney “‘the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’”100 The rule
requires not only that the suspect be allowed to consult with an attorney,
but that no further interrogation may proceed without the presence of

423 U.S. 96 (1975).
Id. In Mosley, the suspect was arrested in connection with certain robberies. The
detective issued Miranda warnings, whereupon Mosley invoked his right to silence. At that
point, the detective ceased the interrogation. More than two hours later, a different
detective took the suspect to a different location in the building and also issued Miranda
warnings. This detective questioned Mosley solely about an unrelated murder. Id. at 104–
05. The fact that a different detective, in a different location, and about a different crime,
had questioned Mosley did not appear determinative. The Court distinguishes a
companion case of Miranda, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), by noting that in
Mosley, in contrast to Westover, “the police gave full ‘Miranda warnings’ to Mosley at the
very outset of each interrogation, subjected him to only a brief period of initial questioning,
and suspended questioning entirely for a significant period before beginning the
interrogation that led to his incriminating statement.” 423 U.S. at 106–07. This was in
contrast to “[t]he cardinal fact” of Westover, which was the failure of the police to give
warnings at all. Id. at 107.
97
Mosely, 423 U.S. at 104.
98
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
99
Id. at 484–85; see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (per curiam) (following an
unambiguous request for counsel, a suspect may not be interrogated and post-request
responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of an initial
request for counsel). The rule in Edwards was extended to cases in which a suspect’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has attached as well. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625
(1986).
100
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
95
96
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counsel.101 The Court reaffirmed this rule in a case in which the police
had properly ceased interrogating a suspect upon his request for
counsel, but several days later a different officer, unaware of the
invocation of the right to counsel, initiated a second interrogation by
issuing warnings, obtaining a waiver, and questioning the suspect on a
separate investigation of a different crime.102 The opinion distinguished
Mosley, noting that “a suspect’s decision to cut off questioning, unlike his
request for counsel, does not raise the presumption that he is unable to
proceed without a lawyer’s advice.”103
The right to counsel protection in Edwards is severely limited by a
decision making it much less likely that many suspects will be found to
have actually requested counsel, even if that may be their intent.
Namely, in Davis v. United States,104 the suspect, who had been
interrogated for an hour and a half stated: “‘Maybe I should talk to a
lawyer.’” 105 The agents interrogating him then paused to inquire
whether he meant to request a lawyer to which the suspect clearly
answered that he did not want a lawyer.106 The majority rejected a rule
requiring police to cease interrogating to arrange for the appointment of
counsel upon an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney.
Unless a suspect unambiguously requests counsel, the interrogation may
proceed uninterrupted.107 The Court would not even go so far as to
require that the officers ask clarifying questions, as was actually done in
the Davis case. Oddly, the majority gave two important reasons why
asking clarifying questions should be required: “Clarifying questions
help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney
if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being
suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the
meaning of the suspect’s statement regarding counsel.”108 However, in
the very next sentence the Court flatly rejected adopting such a rule.109

See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
103
Id. at 683.
104
512 U.S. 452 (1994).
105
Id. at 455.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 459; see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979) (holding that the juvenile
who requested assistance of a juvenile probation officer upon being asked whether he
wanted to give up his right to have an attorney present did not implicitly invoke his right
to counsel or his right to silence).
108
Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
109
Id. at 461–62.
101
102
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In Davis, the Court candidly engaged in a balancing of interests. On
one side of the scale is the interest in protecting the rights of suspects
who are disadvantaged by “fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or
a variety of other reasons” who “will not clearly articulate their right to
counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present.” 110 On
the other side is “the need for effective law enforcement.”111
The Court was right to recognize that certain groups would be more
disadvantaged by this ruling than others. Professors Solan and Tiersna
addressed the common practice of speaking indirectly and politely (“Do
you think I might need a lawyer?”) and hedging or “softening” a
statement (“Maybe I need a lawyer.”).112 They discuss the findings of
research linguists that associate this type of indirect speech style with
“powerless” groups, such as the less educated or those of lower
socioeconomic status.113 They show that “[i]n contrast, better-educated
and more affluent people, who probably have a clearer understanding of
their rights, will be inclined to assert them more directly.”114
The rule in Davis reflects the Court’s apparent view that the interests
of law enforcement were better served by denying the right to counsel to
those groups of people who are disadvantaged by a rule requiring an
unequivocal invocation. The Court feared that a rule requiring clarifying
questions would force police officers to make “difficult judgment calls
about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not
said so . . . .”115 It is curious that the Court would think that requiring
clarifying questions would necessitate that officers make “difficult
judgment calls” because the whole point of asking for clarification, e.g.,
“Are you saying you want a lawyer?” is that the suspect is then forced to
answer the question more definitively. It is hard to avoid the conclusion
that the Court opted for a regime that would allow the police
deliberately to ignore a suspect’s attempts to invoke the Miranda rights, a

Id. at 460.
Id. at 461.
112
See SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 85, at 54–62.
113
Id. at 60–61 (citing WILLIAM M. O’BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER,
AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM 64–71 (Academic Press 1982), and an updated
discussion in JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE AND
POWER 65–66 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998)); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different
Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993)
(arguing that Supreme Court doctrine disadvantages people who use indirect speech
patterns, as is typical of powerless groups, especially women).
114
SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 85, at 60.
115
Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
110
111
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practice that in and of itself can increase the coercive atmosphere
Miranda was intended to dispel.
D. Minimizing the Consequences for Deliberately Violating Miranda
1.

A Weak Exclusionary Rule

The final way in which the Supreme Court weakened the impact of
Miranda was by circumscribing the reach of the exclusionary rule. The
first case that allows the use of statements taken in violation of Miranda
was Harris v. New York.116 In Harris, the Court approved the use of
statements taken in violation of Miranda for purposes of impeaching the
defendant’s testimony at trial.117 The Miranda violation in this case
stemmed from defective warnings that did not apprise the suspect of his
right to counsel.118 This case marks the Court’s first articulation of a
deterrence rationale for determining the scope of Miranda’s exclusionary
rule as well as the prediction that “sufficient deterrence [of Miranda
violations by the police] flows when the evidence in question is made
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.”119 The prediction that
police would be deterred sufficiently by the exclusion of Mirandaviolative statements from the government’s case in chief would become a
central theme in the Court’s Miranda exclusionary rule cases.120 This
deterrence rationale, by the Court’s own terms, should be limited to
unintentional or “good faith” violations of Miranda.121
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Id. at 226 (“The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances.”).
118
Id. at 224.
119
Id. at 225.
120
See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975) (stating that Harris struck a balance
between the need for evidence and the deterrence of law enforcement and that “we are not
disposed to change it now”); see also Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351–52 (1990).
Police violated the prophylactic rule of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), prohibiting
police from initiating questioning of a suspect who invokes Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. The Court permitted the use of statements taken in violation of Jackson, finding
that “the ‘search for truth in a criminal case’ outweighs the ‘speculative possibility’ that
exclusion of evidence might deter future violations . . . .” Id.
121
The Court rejected the need to deter police violations of Miranda in Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). The majority wrote: “Where the official action was pursued in
complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.” Id. In
other words, the inverse must also be true: Where the official action was pursued in
complete bad faith, the deterrence rationale gains much of its force. See also Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (“[T]he absence of any coercion or improper tactics
undercuts the twin rationales—trustworthiness and deterrence—for a broader
[exclusionary] rule.”).
116
117
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Even more than Harris, Oregon v. Hass122 created an incentive for
police to disregard a suspect’s invocation of the Miranda rights.123 In
Hass, the suspect had invoked his right to counsel. Under Edwards,
questioning should have ceased until the suspect had been provided
with counsel.124 Instead, the officer proceeded to take the suspect to the
location where stolen property might be found and, presumably, asked
the suspect to point to the place where the property was located.125
Thus, the officer violated the clear mandate in Edwards to cease
questioning a suspect once he has invoked his right to counsel, whereas
in Harris the violation involved the issuance of inadvertently defective
warnings. Without commenting on whether the violation in Hass was
intentional or not, the Court simply concluded: “We see no valid
distinction to be made in the application of the principles of Harris to that
case and to Hass’ case. . . . [T]here is sufficient deterrence when the
evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in
chief.”126 The Hass opinion concedes that under these facts “the officer
may be said to have little to lose and perhaps something to gain by way
of possibly uncovering impeachment material,” but, calling this a
“speculative possibility,” concludes that the proper balance was struck in
Harris.127 Thus, faced with what may have been an intentional violation
of Miranda and recognizing the incentives to violate Miranda, the Court
nonetheless found the possibility that officers will intentionally violate
Miranda to obtain impeachment material “speculative.”128
Two other cases further reduced the reach of the exclusionary rule—
Michigan v. Tucker129 and Oregon v. Elstad.130 In Tucker, the Court
determined that the Miranda exclusionary rule should not apply to the
“fruits” of Miranda violations, in this case, the name of a witness.131 In
420 U.S. 714 (1975).
See Clymer, supra note 4, at 506.
124
See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.
125
Hass, 420 U.S. at 715–16.
126
Id. at 722.
127
Id. at 723.
128
The impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule was extended to situations in
which the police initiate questioning after a suspect has invoked his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. See supra note 120 (discussing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990)). In
both Harvey and Hass, the Court found that it was possible for a suspect to give a voluntary
statement for purposes of the Due Process Clause requirement, even if taken in violation of
the Miranda rule. See Harvey, 494 U.S. at 353; Hass, 420 U.S. at 722–23.
129
417 U.S. 433 (1974).
130
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
131
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 450–51. The violation consisted of issuing defective warnings that
did not apprise the suspect that counsel would be provided free of charge if he could not
afford to hire one. Id. at 436. Tucker involved derivative evidence that consisted of witness
122
123
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Elstad, the Court concluded that an initial failure to issue warnings prior
to obtaining admissions through custodial interrogation does not
necessarily “taint” a subsequent confession made after properly
following the warning and waiver procedure.132 In both decisions, the
Court explicitly stated its view that a confession obtained in violation of
Miranda is not necessarily coerced, and thus, is not necessarily a violation
of a person’s Fifth Amendment rights.133 The Court found that in both of
these cases the police did not violate the suspects’ constitutional rights,
so the decisions were based instead on a balancing of the need for
trustworthy evidence and the need to deter improper police conduct. An
important aspect of both decisions was the Court’s assessment that the
violations were committed inadvertently or in “good faith.”134 Language
in both decisions seems to suggest that the exceptions to the exclusionary
rule only apply in cases in which the Miranda violations are
inadvertent.135
However, ultimately, the admissibility of the evidence obtained
following a Miranda violation turned not on whether the violation was
intentional or inadvertent, but whether the resulting statements were
voluntary or coerced so as to violate the suspect’s constitutional rights.136
Predictably, both cases further encouraged police officers to violate
Miranda intentionally.137 Tucker offers the use of derivative evidence that
may be discovered by means of statements obtained by continuing to
testimony. Because the Court treats witness testimony differently than other types of
evidence such as weapons or other tangible items, Tucker should be construed narrowly.
Witnesses will not be prevented from testifying due to a violation of Miranda, or even due
to a Fourth Amendment violation for that matter. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S.
268, 277 (1978) (noting that the name of a potential witness is of no evidentiary significance
per se as compared to inanimate evidentiary objects and finding the proffer of the witness’s
testimony to be so attenuated from the Fourth Amendment violation so as to be admissible
under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule).
132
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307–08.
133
Id. at 308–09; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444–45; see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654
(1984) (referring to Miranda warnings as “‘not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution’” and finding that suspect’s statement was not “actually compelled”).
134
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 (noting that the case did not involve coercion or improper
tactics); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445, 447.
135
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 (“As in Tucker, the absence of any coercion or improper tactics
undercuts the twin rationales—trustworthiness and deterrence—for a broader
[exclusionary] rule.”); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 (“Where the official action was pursued in
complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.”).
136
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318 (“We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to
unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled . . . .”); Tucker, 417 U.S. at
448–49 (distinguishing facts in this case from cases in which involuntary statements were
obtained through severe pressure or third-degree torture).
137
See infra notes 149–54 and accompanying text.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 3 [2006], Art. 5

668

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

interrogate a suspect who has invoked his rights, just as Harris offers the
use of those statements for impeachment. Elstad, on the other hand,
permitted officers to refrain from giving warnings, obtaining a
statement, and then later following the warnings and waiver procedure
to obtain a statement that will be admissible for all purposes including
the government’s case in chief.138
2.

No Civil Liability for Deliberate Violations of Miranda

Civil liability for intentional violations of constitutional rights under
§ 1983 provides a potential deterrent against police misconduct.
Intentional violations of Miranda might have been deterred by the threat
of civil liability. However, the Court rejected the claim of a suspect who
had established that a police officer had interrogated him without
issuing Miranda rights in Chavez v. Martinez.139 In the plurality decision
of a badly split Court, the Chavez opinion concludes that a failure to
follow Miranda’s warning and waiver procedure prior to custodial
interrogation does not of itself constitute a constitutional violation, and
thus, there is no civil liability for the omission.140 The Court interpreted
its prior holdings as demonstrating that “mere coercion does not violate
the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled
statements in a criminal case against the witness.”141 Thus, a police
officer who failed to follow the dictates of Miranda does not violate a
constitutional rule. The Constitution would have been violated had a
court admitted the statements produced by the interrogation against the
individual at trial.142 Because courts do not admit statements taken in
See infra notes 167–83 and accompanying text.
538 U.S. 760, 764 (2003).
140
Id. at 772. The Court reiterated its position that the Miranda warnings are a
prophylactic measure to safeguard against a violation of the Fifth Amendment, but the
failure to issue Miranda warnings does not violate the Constitution. Id. The subsequent
interrogation took place under conditions that may have actually coerced the incriminating
statements. The officer had persisted in questioning him despite his objections and even
though he was in the midst of receiving medical treatment for injuries that left him
permanently blind and paralyzed. Id. at 764. The Court remanded the case for the lower
court to rule on the suspect’s claim of liability based on the violation of his substantive due
process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 779–80.
141
Id. at 769.
142
Id. at 772–73. Interestingly, assuming the constitutional violation does not occur until
such time as the statement is admitted in court against the suspect, there still would be no
civil remedy available. Of course, most courts will exclude statements taken in violation of
Miranda from the government’s case in chief. However, if a court should erroneously
admit such a statement, the court’s intervening act of admitting the statement probably
would be considered to break the causal link between the police officer’s violation of the
Miranda requirements and transformation of that act into a constitutional violation. Thus,
the police officer would not be civilly liable. Trial judges would have absolute immunity
138
139
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violation of Miranda in the government’s case in chief, the result is that
no police officer will ever face civil liability for intentionally violating
Miranda.
In sum, the Court’s decisions over the years, with the exception of
the Edwards decision, which was clearly dictated by the language of the
Miranda opinion itself, every other case can be counted as a victory for
the government.143 Even the landmark case of Dickerson v. United
States,144 reaffirming the constitutional basis for the Miranda rule, can be
considered a win for the government. By the time Dickerson was
decided, Miranda had become a minimal obstacle to obtaining
confessions,145 and more often than not, it served to protect confessions
from claims of involuntariness.146
III. SEIBERT AND PATANE FAIL TO HALT THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
“GOING OUTSIDE” MIRANDA
The Supreme Court has had documentation of the practice of
flagrantly violating or “going outside” Miranda as well as abundant
evidence of the institutionalization of this practice for some time. In the
recent cases of Missouri v. Seibert147 and United States v. Patane,148 the
Court failed to make a clear statement denouncing the practice of
intentionally evading Miranda’s protocols. The combined effect of the
decisions is to legitimize the practice of “going outside” Miranda when
the police perceive the benefits of doing so to outweigh the costs. In
short, Miranda is effectively dead, and only its ghost remains in the
empty ritual played out in interrogation rooms across the country.

for what they do in their judicial capacity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). In
the end, no one is civilly liable for a Miranda violation.
143
See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. Some might also consider Doyle v.
Ohio a victory for suspects invoking their rights under Miranda. See Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000) (stating that the Court has broadened the application of the
Miranda doctrine in Doyle). However, the Doyle decision found a Fifth Amendment
violation in the government’s inducement of a person’s silence by the reading of Miranda
warnings and then using that silence against a person at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
617 (1976). It was not a case involving a violation of the warnings and waiver protocol
itself. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
144
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
145
See id. at 443. (“If anything, our subsequent cases [interpreting Miranda] have reduced
the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the
decision’s core ruling . . . .”).
146
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
147
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
148
542 U.S. 630 (2004).
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The following section addresses the jurisprudential shift that allows
the Court to proclaim that Miranda is a constitutionally based rule while
at the same time treating a violation of Miranda as something less than
the violation of a constitutional right.
The subsequent sections
demonstrate how the Court has finally killed Miranda, first by failing to
provide an effective remedy for intentional violations and then by
refusing to eliminate the incentives to violate Miranda.
A.

Encouraging the Practice of “Going Outside” Miranda

The cumulative effect of the Court’s jurisprudence has been to free
interrogators to obey or disobey Miranda’s strictures depending on the
balance of advantages and disadvantages.149 In some cases, following
the letter of the Miranda rule may make it easier to produce an
admissible confession. In others, it may be perceived as advantageous to
disregard the dictates of Miranda, even if doing so will render a possible
confession inadmissible in the government’s case in chief. Have some
police departments made a practice of “going outside” Miranda when
doing so is advantageous? Clearly, the answer is yes.
Exact numbers are not available, but evidence suggests the practice
has been spreading. Charles Weisselberg’s 1998 article cites police
training manuals from California that promoted this “new vision of
Miranda” and encouraged officers to ignore invocations of Miranda.150
He notes that these training manuals were distributed statewide and that
deliberate violations of Miranda were reported in counties all across the
state.151 In addition, he finds evidence of deliberate violations of Miranda
in at least two other states, Colorado and Arizona, as well as the District
of Columbia.152 The Seibert case, a Missouri case, brings the count to four
states and the District of Columbia. More importantly, the Court in
Seibert cites a national police-training program that had instructed
officers of the advantages of intentionally failing to issue the Miranda
warnings in some situations.153 The Court also cites cases from four
federal Courts of Appeal in which the officers did not issue Miranda
Clymer assesses the advantages and disadvantages of giving as well as withholding
Miranda warnings, and of honoring as well as ignoring requests to terminate questioning.
See Clymer, supra note 4, at 512–25.
150
Weisselberg, supra note †, at 132–37.
151
Id. at 136. He also reports that “two LAPD interrogation forms even have a box for
officers to check if they questioned ‘outside Miranda.’” Id. at 137; see also Clymer, supra note
4, at 523–25 (addressing practice of going outside Miranda); Leo & White, supra note 21, at
460–63 (describing strategies employed by interrogators questioning “outside Miranda”).
152
Weisselberg, supra note †, at 137–38.
153
See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
149
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warnings before obtaining incriminating statements followed by the
issuance of warnings and the making of a second statement.154 The next
section discusses the issue raised in Seibert and the Court’s plurality
decision.
B. Seibert: The Court Fails to Denounce Intentional Violations
Missouri v. Seibert represents the first time the Supreme Court has
considered an admittedly intentional violation of Miranda. It is also the
first acknowledgment that police departments have received training
that promotes the practice of violating the dictates of Miranda in certain
situations. The first sentence of the judgment of the Court, penned by
Justice Souter, describes the case as testing “a police protocol.”155 The
protocol, which he dubs the “question first” approach, “calls for giving
no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel until interrogation has
produced a confession.”156 This first statement would clearly be
inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Miranda. However, the
question-first approach calls on the officer to follow up the first
confession with the issuance of Miranda warnings and then elicit the
same confession from the suspect a second time. The Seibert case
addressed the admissibility of this second statement. While the “test”
proposed in the judgment for the Court would have curtailed the
“question first” practice, the actual holding of the case is the position
taken by Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment on the
narrowest grounds,157 and that rule does little to curb the practice.
The facts of the Seibert case are appalling. As reported by the Court:
Patrice Seibert’s 12-year-old son Jonathan had cerebral
palsy, and when he died in his sleep she feared charges
of neglect because of bedsores on his body. In her
presence, two of her teenage sons and two of their
friends devised a plan to conceal the facts surrounding
Jonathan’s death by incinerating his body in the course
154
The Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the four circuit courts of appeal.
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 607 (2004) (citing United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030
(9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Gale,
952 F.2d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1989)).
155
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604.
156
Id. at 601.
157
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976) (“When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
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of burning the family’s mobile home, in which they
planned to leave Donald Rector, a mentally ill teenager
living with the family, to avoid the appearance that
Jonathan had been unattended. Seibert’s son Darian and
a friend set the fire, and Donald died.158
The investigation apparently turned to Seibert within a few days. At
3 a.m., five days after the fire, police officers awakened Seibert at the
hospital where her son, Darian, was receiving treatment, and arrested
her. The arresting officer, Officer Kevin Clinton, stated that he had
followed the instructions of another officer, Officer Richard Hanrahan, to
refrain from issuing Miranda warnings.159 Upon arriving at the police
station, Seibert was left alone in an interview room for fifteen to twenty
minutes. Thereafter, Officer Hanrahan questioned her for thirty to forty
minutes without first issuing Miranda warnings. At one point, he
squeezed her arm and repeated, “‘Donald was also to die in his
sleep.’”160 Seibert finally admitted that she knew Donald was meant to
die in the fire by answering simply, “yes.” She was then given a twentyminute coffee and cigarette break. Following the break, Officer
Hanrahan turned on a tape recorder, gave Seibert the Miranda warnings
for the first time, and obtained a signed waiver of rights from her. He
resumed the questioning: “‘Ok, ‘trice, we’ve been talking for a little
while about what happened on Wednesday the twelfth, haven’t we?’”
Then he confronted her with her earlier statements taken before the
issuance of warnings.161 By reminding her of her earlier statement, he
was able to get her to agree that they had intended Donald to die in his
sleep.
At a suppression hearing, Officer Hanrahan candidly testified that
he made a “conscious decision” to withhold Miranda warnings as part of
the question-first “interrogation technique” that he had been taught.162
He also stated that the technique was promoted not only by the officer’s
department in Rolla, Missouri, but by a national police training
organization and other departments in which he had worked.163 The
Court also cited written statements by the Police Law Institute,
published in the Illinois Police Law Manual, endorsing the question-first
tactic and noted similar statements from police law manuals in New
158
159
160
161
162
163
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York and California as well as a police law treatise.164 However, the
Court acknowledged that not all law enforcement educators advocated
the violation of Miranda’s protocol.165
The trial court suppressed the first incriminating statement as taken
in violation of Miranda but admitted the second disputed statement in
which Seibert again admitted her role in killing Donald. The Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed. Notably, the court held that the second
confession was involuntary because the interrogation tactic was
“intended to deprive Seibert of the opportunity to knowingly and
intelligently waive her Miranda rights” in that “[b]oth stages of the
interview formed a nearly continuous interrogation . . . .”166 The state
high court also distinguished Oregon v. Elstad,167 upholding the
admission of a second, warned statement following a first, unwarned
statement, on the basis that Elstad involved an unintentional Miranda
violation, unlike the intentional violation in this case.168 The Court
granted certiorari to resolve a split in the Courts of Appeal on this
issue.169
1.

Elstad and Bayer: Of “Cats in Bags” and “Fruits of Poisonous Trees”

The Seibert decision relies heavily on two prior cases that had
presented variants of the question-first issue. In Oregon v. Elstad, the
initial failure to issue Miranda warnings was not intentional. In United
States v. Bayer,170 which pre-dates Miranda, the initial confession was
actually coerced while the second was given several months later under
favorable conditions.171 Both decisions called upon the Court to address
the reach of exclusionary rules—Miranda’s exclusionary rule in Elstad
and the Fourteenth Amendment due process exclusionary rule for
involuntary confessions in Bayer.
In Elstad, the officers went to the home of a teenage suspect to
execute an arrest warrant for him. Not realizing that questioning a
suspect in his home would constitute “custody” for Miranda purposes,
they interviewed him in his living room, and after asking his mother to
step into the kitchen and without issuing Miranda warnings, they
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Id. at 611 n.2.
Id.
State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.3d 700, 706 (2002).
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
Seibert, 93 S.W.3d at 706.
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 607.
331 U.S. 532 (1947).
Id. at 535.
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obtained a confession. They then drove him to the police station. One
hour later, they issued Miranda warnings and obtained a second
confession.172
The Supreme Court held that the second confession was properly
admitted and did not violate the rule in Miranda.173 The Court rejected
the application of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, explaining
that its application would assume that, in violating the Miranda rule,
there has been a constitutional violation.174 The Court characterized the
omission of warnings in the first instance as “technically in violation of
Miranda,”175 meaning that it was an “uncoercive” Miranda violation.176
The majority explained that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of
compelled testimony only, namely, involuntary statements or those not
taken in compliance with Miranda.
The Miranda presumption of compulsion does not require, however,
that the fruits of such violations be discarded as inherently tainted.177
Because the unwarned statement did not actually infringe on his
constitutional rights, there are no “fruits” to suppress in any case.178 The
Court reasoned that suppression would disable the police from
obtaining confessions, even when there is no coercion.
In Elstad, the Court also downplayed the significance of a suspect’s
letting “the cat out of the bag” during the initial interrogation. The
Court considered the psychological impact of the first confession to be
irrelevant if no official coercion was used. The majority also questioned
whether the initial disclosure has any psychological effect at all, stating
that “the causal connection between any psychological disadvantage
created by his [initial] admission and his ultimate decision to cooperate
is speculative and attenuated at best.”179 Therefore, the Court ruled that
there should be no exclusion of the second statement unless it was
determined to have been given involuntarily.180
The Elstad decision cites the Court’s pre-Miranda decision in Bayer for
the proposition that even if one confesses after letting the “cat out of the
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
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Id. at 318.
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Id. at 308 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)).
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bag,” a second confession may still be admissible if the taint of the earlier
confession has been removed.181 In Bayer, the Court addressed a
situation in which a presumably involuntary confession was obtained
first,182 followed by a six-month lapse after which the suspect made an
essentially identical second confession. This time the defendant’s liberty
was not severely limited, and he was given “fair warning” prior to being
questioned.183
In Bayer, the Court articulated the “cat out of the bag” theory in
which an initial involuntary confession can create psychological
pressures on an accused to give a second confession, even if the second
interrogation occurs in a non-coercive atmosphere:
Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the
bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is
never thereafter free of the psychological and practical
disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get
the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In
such a sense, a later confession always may be looked
upon as fruit of the first.184
The Court did not lay down a rule automatically excluding a second
confession that is the “fruit” of an earlier involuntary confession. As the
Elstad majority notes, the Bayer decision states: “But this Court has never
gone so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances
Id. at 311 (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1947)).
According to the decision:
After service of distinction in Burma, Radovich then 24 years of age,
was ordered to report to Mitchel Field. Upon arrival on August 9,
1944, he was placed under arrest and confined in the psychopathic
ward in the station hospital. Here, for some time, he was denied
callers, communication, comforts and facilities which it is needless to
detail. Charges for court-martial were not promptly served on him as
said to be required by the 70th Article of War . . . nor was he taken
before a magistrate for arraignment on any charges preferred by civil
authorities. Military charges were finally served on May 30, 1945.
Bayer, 331 U.S. at 539.
183
Id. at 541.
184
Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540. The Court also endorsed the “cat-out-of-the-bag” approach in
Brown v. Illinois as well, although the illegal act in this case violated the Fourth
Amendment, not Miranda. In Brown, the suspect had been illegally arrested and then had
given incriminating statements on two occasions. The Court held that the first statements
were clearly admissible as a product of the illegal arrest. Id. at 604. The second statement
was also ruled inadmissible as a “result and the fruit of the first.” Id. at 605. It was
significant that “Brown’s first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than
two hours, and there was no intervening event of significance whatsoever.” See Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975).
181
182
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which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a
usable one after those conditions have been removed.”185 However,
what the Elstad decision fails to mention is that Bayer does not simply
admit a second confession upon proof that it was voluntarily given.
Rather, Bayer provides that the “cat out of the bag” scenario creates a
presumption that an involuntary confession taints the later confession,
thus placing on the government the burden of showing that the taint of
the first interrogation has dissipated.186 This may be proved by
considering the passage of time, the nature of the restraint on the
suspect’s liberty, whether the suspect was warned of the consequences of
confessing, and other relevant factors.187 If the taint has in fact been
removed, then the second confession is considered voluntary and may
be admitted, which is what the Court actually decided in Bayer.
This rule is a far cry from the rule in Elstad that requires the
defendant to bear the burden of proving that the second confession was
involuntarily given. For one thing, the Supreme Court minimized the
psychological disadvantage of having made an initial unwarned
confession as “speculative and attenuated at best.”188 Thus, lower courts
are, in effect, instructed not to put much weight on this factor. In
contrast, the Court signaled to the lower courts that they should consider
it highly probative “that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed
of his rights.”189
In neither Bayer nor Elstad did the inquiry turn on whether the
officers had acted in good or bad faith in eliciting the first confession
improperly and then eliciting a later second confession following the
proper procedures. It is fair to say that the Court in Bayer suspected that
the initial confession was intentionally coerced from the suspect, while
the police omission in Elstad was most likely considered a good-faith

Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540–41 (quoted in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985)).
The Bayer opinion does not actually speak to the issue of burdens of proof. However,
the Court has subsequently made clear that the government should bear the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the fruits of an illegally obtained
confession would inevitably have been discovered. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444
n.5 (1984). This is the same burden of proof applied in suppression hearings to determine
the admissibility of evidence derived from violations of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
187
In Bayer, the Court took into account the fact that the second confession was given six
months after the first, that the only restraint on the suspect’s freedom was that he could not
leave the military base without permission, and that he was given “fair warning” prior to
the second interrogation. 331 U.S. at 541.
188
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 313–14.
189
Id. at 318.
185
186
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mistake.190 The Seibert case squarely presented the question of a badfaith failure to follow Miranda.
2.

Seibert Charts a New Course for Intentional Evasions of Miranda

The Seibert and Patane cases reflect deep divisions among the
members of the Court. Only four Justices are represented in the opinioin
delivering the judgment of the Court in Seibert. Justice Souter, who
authored the opinion, was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. The concurring opinion, issued by Justice Kennedy, announced
a narrower rule than that of Justice Souter’s opinion. Thus, Justice
Kennedy’s rule becomes the applicable standard. The differences
between the two opinions are striking.
The first line of Justice Souter’s opinion frames the question as
testing “a police protocol,” recognizing the institutionalization of the
question-first tactic for evading Miranda. He also acknowledged that
training programs have encouraged officers to ignore invocations of the
Miranda rights in order to reap the benefits of the impeachment
exception of Harris.191 It is thus not surprising that the plurality opinion,
while professing to abide by the rule in Elstad, comes closer to applying a
rule like that in Bayer. As in both Elstad and Bayer, Justice Souter would
allow for the possibility that a second, Mirandized statement could be
admissible. Elstad cleared the second statement for admission if it met
the standards for “voluntariness,” whereas Bayer required also that the
“taint” of letting the cat out of the bag had dissipated, in that case by the
passage of time and the provision of more favorable conditions.192 The
plurality set forth an objective rule that turns simply on “whether it
would be reasonable to find that in [a question first, warn later situation]
the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.”193 This
rule resembles that in Bayer, in that the determination of effectiveness of
the warnings in the Seibert plurality is determined by examining the
same types of factors as the determination of whether the taint has
dissipated in Bayer. Justice Souter listed the following factors to
In Bayer, the Court notes that the military officials failed to permit the suspect to
communicate with the outside world and denied him “comforts” and “facilities.”
Moreover, they failed to follow their own procedures for charging and arraigning a person.
Bayer, 331 U.S. at 539. Thus, one can fairly conclude that the maltreatment of the suspect
was intended to coerce a confession. On the other hand, “it is fair to read Elstad as treating
the living room conversation as a good-faith Miranda mistake.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542
U.S. 600, 615 (2004).
191
542 U.S. at 611; see also supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
192
See supra notes 173–78, 187–88 and accompanying text.
193
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611–12.
190
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determine the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings preceding the
second interrogation:
[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and
answers in the first round of interrogation, the
overlapping content of the two statements, the timing
and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of
police personnel, and the degree to which the
interrogator’s questions treated the second round as
continuous with the first.194
Similarly, in Bayer, the Court took into account the passage of time
between the first and second interrogations and the fact that the suspect
had been warned about the consequences of confessing to determine that
the taint of the first confession had dissipated.195
Thus, while claiming to abide by Elstad’s refusal to apply a “tainted
fruits” approach to second, Mirandized confessions, the plurality opted
for an objective test that appears to call for a determination of the
connectedness of the two interrogations, a test remarkably similar to a
“taint” test under Bayer. The opinion might be consistent with Elstad if it
applied only to intentional violations of Miranda, whereas the violation
in Elstad was clearly inadvertent; however, Justice Souter explicitly
rejects a test that turns on the intent of the officer.196
Applying the plurality’s objective rule to the facts in Seibert, Justice
Souter gave both an institutional and an individual reason in finding
Seibert’s second confession inadmissible. Exclusion of the statement
serves the institutional purpose of furthering the objectives of Miranda
“[b]ecause the question-first tactic effectively threatens to thwart
Miranda’s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would
be admitted.”197 Moreover, exclusion of the statement is warranted
“because the facts here do not reasonably support a conclusion that the
warnings given could have served their purpose.”198

Id. at 615.
See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
196
The plurality rejects a test that turns on proof of the intent of the officer: “Because the
intent of the officer will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here . . . the focus is on
facts apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at work.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616
n.6.
197
Id. at 617.
198
Id.
194
195
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In contrast to the judgment of the Court, Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion set forth a narrower rule that limits the application of
the plurality’s test for “Miranda effectiveness” to cases in which the
initial failure to issue warnings is deliberate.199 By virtue of providing
narrower grounds for exclusion of the evidence, his opinion now
provides the new rule in constitutional adjudication of such claims. The
plurality eschewed a subjective intent rule on the grounds that the
inquiry should turn instead on the effect of the police conduct on the
suspect.200 At least one commentator called the test a “terrible idea” and
argued that the test will be impossible for defendants to prove in most
cases.201 Applying a “bad faith” test to question-first situations may not
even curb training programs from instructing officers to employ the
“deliberate, two-step strategy,” as Justice Kennedy calls it.202 As officers
cannot be sued even for intentionally failing to follow the Miranda
warnings and waiver protocols, training programs can be expected to
continue to apprise officers of the costs and benefits of issuing warnings
before questioning.
Justice Kennedy’s rule also does more than simply limit the “Miranda
effectiveness” test to intentional question-first cases, it also provides for
additional avenues to admit statements taken in violation of this
narrower rule. He provides an exception to the narrowly constrained
exclusionary rule for situations in which officers take “[c]urative
measures” to render the warnings effective.203 In contrast to the
plurality’s rule that considers a number of factors relating to the
connectedness of the two questioning sessions and the statements
given,204 Justice Kennedy considers a “substantial break in time and

Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Breyer also issued a concurring opinion in
which he agrees with this part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. He would apply a “fruits” test
to intentional violations and create an exception for “good faith” violations. Id. at 617–18
(Breyer, J., concurring). He would also apply the fruits doctrine to physical evidence. Id.
Thus, there are actually two Justices who subscribe to rules turning on the subjective intent
of the officers.
200
See supra note 196.
201
Joelle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v. Seibert “Bad
Faith” Police Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 410–16 (2005) (arguing that the bad
faith test is irrelevant, impossible to prove, and contrary to Supreme Court precedent).
202
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
203
Id. at 622.
204
The Court lists: “[T]he completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the
first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and
setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to
which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.”
Id. at 615 (majority opinion).
199
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circumstances,” presumably without more, to “suffice in most cases” as a
curative measure.
He also approved the totally new curative measure of having the
officer issue “an additional warning that explains the likely
inadmissibility of the prewarning custodial statement.”205 Given the
apparent ineffectiveness of the original, simple Miranda warnings, even
when properly issued,206 it is hard to imagine how Justice Kennedy’s
highly technical and legalistic warning about the inadmissibility of an
earlier statement but admissibility of any subsequent statements will be
effective; the utter confusion of suspects is more likely.207 As it turns out,
such curative warnings are not to be found in subsequent case law.
Instead, cases decided after Seibert confirm that Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion has resulted in almost all statements that are
produced by “two-step” interrogations being admitted based on a
variety of factors leading courts to distinguish Seibert and find the cases
more like Elstad.208

Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See supra Part II.
207
Interestingly, the plurality opinion might be read to view an additional warning as
appropriate, but it also seems to recognize the confusion inherent in mid-course issuance of
warnings during a question-first interrogation process. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613
(“[T]elling a suspect that ‘anything you say can and will be used against you,’ without
expressly excepting the statement just given, could lead to an entirely reasonable inference
that what he has just said will be used, with subsequent silence being of no avail.”).
208 The Courts find Seibert inapplicable if some of the following factors apply: there is a
break in time between the two interrogations, a change in location, a change in
interrogating officers, a lack of continuity between the first and second statements, a lack of
evidence of intent to undermine Miranda, or if the initial questioning was brief. For a
representative sampling of the numerous decisions applying Seibert, see United States v.
Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1138-39 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that officers did not
question defendant because they merely recited the evidence against him, and concluding
that “it remained objectively reasonable for him to make [subsequent] incriminating
statements”); United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 532 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that subsequent
questioning was not part of deliberate choice to flout Miranda); United States v. Fellers, 397
U.S. 1090, 1097–98 (8th Cir. 2005) (assessing a situation concerning a one-hour break,
change in location, no use of first statement during second questioning, and a brief first
conversation); United States v. Briones, 390 U.S. 610, 614 n.3 (8th Cir. 2004) (addressing
questioning with more than one-day break, different settings, officers represented different
agencies, and no significant overlap or continuity); United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez,
384 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2004) (considering questioning with a five-day break, different
officer, not continuous questioning, and an unintentional first confession); and United States
v. Yamba, 407 F. Supp. 2d 703, 718 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (finding that subsequent questioning was
not a deliberate attempt to circumvent Miranda). A small minority of cases with facts
remarkably like those in Seibert find Seibert to require exclusion of a second statement. See,
e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 384 F.3d 520, 525 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Renker, No.
02CR 1099, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17107 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2004).
205
206
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Justice O’Connor, who wrote the majority opinion in Elstad, wrote
the dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas joined. She took issue with the plurality’s treatment
of Elstad, accusing it of “disfigure[ing]” it by essentially adopting a
“‘fruits’ analysis.”209 She reiterated the oft-stated view that “there is
simply is no place for a robust deterrence doctrine with regard to
violations of Miranda v. Arizona,” and thus there is no need to exclude the
“fruits” of a Miranda violation.210 She restated the rule in Elstad that
would admit a second, warned confession so long as it was voluntary.211
However, she agreed with the plurality in rejecting an intent-based
test.212
Thus, the plurality decision initially gives the impression that the
Supreme Court has taken a more stringent approach in evaluating tactics
that threaten to drain the substance out of Miranda, but the actual rule of
the case authored by Justice Kennedy will probably not diminish
“question-first” practices in the long run. Proving an officer’s subjective
intent can be nearly impossible if the officer professes not to have acted
deliberately in violating Miranda. Training programs will most likely
continue to stress the costs and benefits of violating Miranda
intentionally. However, now the training will also include explanations
about the “[c]urative measures” that must be taken if an officer engages
in the deliberate “question-first” tactic during an interrogation. It will be
a simple matter to teach officers that they should wait a substantial
amount of time before proceeding to issue warnings and obtain a second
confession, or the officers should issue the new additional warning about
the legal consequences of having previously confessed. In short, Seibert
does very little, if anything, to curb the practice that threatens to
completely undermine Miranda’s safeguards.
C. Patane: Physical Fruits of Miranda Violations Still Admissible
United States v. Patane presented the issue of whether the Fifth
Amendment requires the exclusion at trial of the physical fruits of a
Miranda violation. The issue would not have been a novel one prior to
Dickerson.213 However, after Dickerson the Tenth Circuit took the position
that Dickerson instructed courts to treat Miranda as a constitutional rule,
Id. at 622–24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
Id. at 623.
211
Id. at 627–28.
212
Id. at 625.
213
530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding that Miranda is a constitutional rule and may not be
overruled by Congress, and refusing to overrule it).
209
210
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and thus the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine should apply. Other
courts of appeal disagreed, applying Elstad and Tucker as usual.214
Unlike the facts in the Seibert case, the facts in Patane did not involve
a deliberate violation of Miranda.215 In Patane, the arresting officers took
Patane into custody at a residence and attempted to advise him of his
Miranda rights. Patane interrupted the detective, asserting that he
already knew his rights. Neither of the two officers attempted to
complete the warning prior to asking him questions about a gun.216
Thus, the facts presented did not give the Court the opportunity to
consider a situation in which an officer’s deliberate violation of the
Miranda protocols might produce physical evidence.
Another plurality decision maintains the status quo prior to
Dickinson, with five Justices agreeing that the exclusionary rule should
not be extended to reach nontestimonial physical fruits.217 In reaching
this outcome, the lineups of Justices are inverted. Justice Thomas was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in announcing the
judgment of the Court and reiterating their views that even an
intentional failure to issue Miranda warnings does not violate the
Constitution; thus, there is “nothing to deter.”218 However, this time
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, sided with the Seibert
dissenters in concurring with the plurality. Justice Kennedy took the
view in Patane that the “[a]dmission of nontestimonial physical fruits
. . . even more so than the postwarning statements to the police in Elstad
and Michigan v. Tucker, does not run the risk of admitting into trial an
accused’s coerced incriminating statements against himself.”219
Moreover, he concluded that, on balance, “the important probative value
of reliable physical evidence” outweighs the benefits of a “deterrence
rationale sensitive to both law enforcement interests and a suspect’s
rights during an in-custody interrogation.”220 Apparently, the fact that
physical evidence discovered by means of statements taken in violation
of Miranda appeared to be so attenuated to Justice Kennedy that he
would admit the evidence without concern about encouraging future
deliberate violations. His lack of concern about deliberate violations in
this case seems somewhat inconsistent with his position in Seibert in
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
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United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634–38 (2004).
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 642.
Id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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which he concurred in the decision to exclude the post-warning
statement because it was part of a “deliberate, two-step strategy.”221
The plurality members in Seibert, Justices Souter, Breyer, Stevens,
and Ginsburg, wrote dissenting opinions in Patane. The dissenters
accused the plurality of “closing their eyes to the consequences of giving
an evidentiary advantage to those who ignore Miranda” and “add[ing]
an important inducement for interrogators to ignore the rule in that
case.”222 The dissenters lamented that Patane creates an incentive for
police to violate Miranda, which they believe is “an odd one, coming
from the Court on the same day it decides Missouri v. Seibert.”223 In fact,
although the Justices are split on their views on Miranda, in the end, a
majority of them concluded that even intentional “violations” of the rule
in Miranda should rarely, if ever, result in the exclusion of anything more
than the statements directly obtained by that violation. The Court’s
subsequent decision in Wisconsin v. Knapp224 made it clear that Patane
should be read to approve the admissibility of physical fruits of
intentional Miranda violations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Seibert and Patane have finally done it: Even deliberate violations of
Miranda can yield admissible statements and admissible physical fruits
of such statements due to the question-first strategy and the approved
curative measures. Thus, there is truly nothing left of Miranda. After the
Chavez case, police officers understood that they need not fear being sued
for intentional violations of Miranda. Now it is also clear that they need
not fear losing evidence because of their failures to issue warnings prior
to interrogation. Miranda is a rule of no consequence.
At the same time as these unfortunate developments in Miranda
jurisprudence, evidence of the dangers of coercive interrogation tactics,
especially when used against minors, the mentally retarded, or other
vulnerable people, continues to grow.225 Scholars and policy makers are
increasingly calling for alternative measures to counteract the coercive
See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
Patane, 542 U.S. at 646 (Souter, J., dissenting). They conclude on a similar note:
“There is no way to read this case except as an unjustifiable invitation to law enforcement
officers to flout Miranda when there may be physical evidence to be gained.” Id. at 647.
223
Id.
224
542 U.S. 952 (2004) (considering a case in which Wisconsin Supreme Court excluded
physical evidence that was a result of a clearly intentional violation of Miranda, and
vacating and remanding the lower court’s decision for reconsideration in light of Patane).
225
See supra note 27.
221
222
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forces at work during custodial interrogations.
Videotaping
interrogations is lauded by some as an effective alternative measure,226
but other alternatives should also be considered. It is time for the next
chapter in the history of our regulation of custodial interrogations to be
written. The Miranda chapter has effectively come to a close.

See WHITE, supra note 27, at 190–95 (making the reliability argument for taping);
Innocence Project, supra note 27 (noting that taping is required by law in Alaska,
Minnesota, and the United Kingdom; calling for videotaping throughout the United States;
and providing a link to the report of Illinois “Governor Ryan’s Death Penalty
Commission,” which concludes that videotaping is good law enforcement policy); Moreno,
supra note 202, at 417–18 (arguing that videotaping will be more important to counteract
effects of Seibert’s bad faith test); Slobogin, supra note 4 (making policy and legal arguments
for taping). But see Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant, 10
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 496 (1998) (arguing that taping is has practical limitations that
militate against it as a foolproof alternative).
226
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